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Digest: 21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court
Rachel Warren
Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J., Baxter, J., Moreno,
J., and Corrigan, J.
Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J.
Concurring Opinion by Werdegar, J.
Issue
Should attorney’s fees be included under the made-whole
rule for med-pay insurance policy reimbursement?
Facts
Silvia Quintana sustained personal injuries after an
automobile accident with a third party.1 Under her med-pay2
insurance policy, 21st Century Insurance paid Quintana $1,000.3
Quintana then brought a personal injury claim against the third
party, which was eventually settled for $6,000.4 To obtain this
settlement, Quintana incurred approximately $2,100 in attorney
fees.5 At 21st Century’s request for reimbursement, Quintana
sent the insurer $600, which amounted to the $1,000 med-pay
benefit less a pro rata share of the attorney fees.6 The insurer
accepted this amount as full reimbursement.7
Subsequently, Quintana brought a class action lawsuit
against 21st Century.8 Her causes of action alleged a violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200, conversion, unjust
enrichment and declaratory relief.9 Her main argument was that
the insurer could not require any reimbursement from her,
because when taking her attorney fees into account, she had not
1

21st Century Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 213 P.3d 972, 974 (Cal.

2009).
2 A “med-pay” insurance policy provides medical coverage for the insured’s medical
expenses caused by an accident. Id. The amount of coverage is typically low, in exchange
for lower premiums. Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 974–75.
8 Id. at 975.
9 Id.
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yet been made whole.10 Essentially, Quintana’s reasoning was
that, after subtracting the attorney fees from her $7,000 total
recovery ($1,000 from med-pay and $6,000 from the settlement)
she only recovered approximately $4,900.11 This fell short of her
total actual damages of $6,000, and thus under the made-whole
rule the insurer was not permitted to request reimbursement.12
According to Quintana, the made-whole rule is not satisfied, and
thus reimbursement cannot be sought, unless the insured has
also recovered the full amount of attorney fees.13 Her claim
represented a class of similarly-situated California policyholders
of 21st Century.14
21st Century then demurred on the complaint on the
grounds that in California, litigation expenses are not included in
calculating whether an insured has been made whole.15 Instead,
21st Century argued that under the common fund doctrine,
attorney fees should be separately calculated in equitable
apportionment, with the insurer paying a pro rata portion of the
fees.16 The insurer maintained that this was consistent with
both the made-whole rule and the common fund doctrine.17 The
trial court overruled the demurrer, and the insurer filed a
petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal.18 In
granting the writ, the Court of Appeal held that any attorney
fees incurred by an insured in recovering losses from a third
party tortfeasor should not be considered when determining
whether the insured has been made whole for reimbursement
purposes.19 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal ordered the trial
court to vacate the judgment and enter an order to sustain 21st
Quintana petitioned the California
Century’s demurrer.20
Supreme Court for review.21
Analysis
The court catalogued the history of both the made-whole rule
and the common fund doctrine in California.22 The made-whole
rule places a limit on when an insurer can invoke its policy’s
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 976–78.
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reimbursement clause.23
Specifically, the made-whole rule
provides that there can be no reimbursement until the insured
has recovered the entire amount of his or her damages.24 The
court pointed out that the California Court of Appeal has
previously defined the made-whole rule in such a way that does
not consider attorney fees,25 and no California court has ever
specifically held otherwise.26 The common fund doctrine provides
that a plaintiff who brings an action resulting in the creation or
preservation of a common fund may recover his or her attorney
fees out of that common fund.27 This hundred-year-old legal
theory was extended to insurance law in 1961,28 and has been
recognized as applicable to insurance reimbursement since 1975
as a way to avoid unjust enrichment to the insurer.29
The court noted that in this was a case of first impression
because California courts have thus far been unclear as to how
the made-whole rule and common fund doctrine are to be applied
to attorney fees in the med-pay reimbursement context.30 As an
example, the court pointed to Plut v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
where the Court of Appeal held that the insurer is entitled to
reimbursement only after the insured has recouped his or her
loss plus “some or all” of the litigation expenses, but failed to
expand on what “some or all” entailed or discuss the common
fund doctrine.31 The court also looked to Progressive West Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, which held that the made-whole rule does
apply to reimbursement claims, and that under the common fund
doctrine, the reimbursement must be reduced by a proportional
amount of incurred attorney fees.32 As such, thus far California
cases have not made clear whether the insured is entitled to
recover some costs under a pro rata common fund doctrine
theory, or all costs under the made-whole rule.33
Due to the lack of clarity in California jurisprudence, the
court looked to other states.34 Unfortunately, a survey of sister
states was inconclusive, because those states recognizing the

23 Id. at 976 (citing Plut v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 104 (2000);
Sapiano v. Williamsburg Nat. Ins. Co., 28 Cal.App.4th 533, 536 (1994)).
24 Id. (citing Plut, 85 Cal.App.4th at 104).
25 Sapiano, 28 Cal.App.4th at 536–37.
26 21st Century, 213 P.3d at 976.
27 Id. at 977 (citing Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Cal.App.3d 458, 466 (1976)).
28 Id. (citing United Servs. Auto Assn. v. Hills, 109 N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1961)).
29 Id. (citing Quinn v. State of California, 539 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1975)).
30 Id. at 978.
31 Id. (citing Plut v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 105 (2000)).
32 Id. at 978–79 (citing Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4th
263, 276 (2005)).
33 Id. at 979.
34 Id.
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made-whole rule for insurance law have yet to reach a consensus
on the issue.35
The court next turned to Chong v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., a federal district court decision predicting that California
courts would be likely to follow jurisdictions holding that
litigation costs incurred by the insured must be included in
calculating whether the insured has in fact been made whole.36
In determining that this was not unfair to the insurance
company, the federal district court held that the burden of going
unpaid should fall to the insurer because it is being paid to
assumed that risk.37 A contrary holding, the district court
reasoned, would allow an insurer to simply “sit on the sidelines”
while the insured made the efforts to recover from the third party
tortfeasor and then reap the rewards to reimbursement.38
The court found the reasoning of Chong unpersuasive.39
First, the assumption that the insurance company has assumed
the risk ignores the limited nature of med-pay insurance
provisions.40 In exchange for lower premiums, the policy holder
of a med-pay insurance policy has only contracted for the insurer
to assume the risk of medial payments; anything beyond this
exceeds the insurer’s contractual risk.41 Secondly, the “sit on the
sidelines” rationale was not persuasive because an insurer is
generally prohibited from intervening in personal injury cases
and thus could not participate in the lawsuit if it wanted to.42
Even if the insurer could intervene, it would likely be met by
resistance from the insured’s attorney.43 Further, the court
pointed out that the insurer would not have a reason to
intervene, since it is unlikely that litigation costs would be larger
than the amount of reimbursement.44 Thus, the court rejected
Quintana’s implicit reliance on Chong to assert that including
attorney fees in the made-whole calculation will not give
policyholders double recovery.45

35
36

Id. at 979–80.
Chong v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 428 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1147 (S.D.Cal.

2006).
37 Id. at 1145 (quoting Skauge v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 565
P.2d 628, 632 (Mont. 1977) (italics omitted)).
38 Id. at 1145.
39 21st Century, 213 P.3d at 981.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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Finally, the court looked to policy considerations, noting
again that the primary policy reason for insurance
reimbursement is to prevent double recovery on the part of the
insured.46 First, the court found that the collateral source rule
was not controlling because it addresses the distribution of
litigation costs as between parties to a lawsuit (the injured party
and the tortfeasor), and thus was inapplicable as to the
distribution of litigation costs as between an insured and nonparty insurer.47 The court also rejected Quintana’s reliance on
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as this doctrine does
not apply to med-pay reimbursement disputes.48 Because medpay provisions are express contractual provisions, the court
refused to read implied terms or impose additional substantive
duties.49 Moreover, the court pointed out that including attorney
fees in made-whole calculations would essentially shift the
burden of paying attorney fees to the insurance companies,
resulting in the additional costs being passed to consumers
through increased premiums.50 This would cause med-pay
insurance to become less accessible to those who need it most.51
In contrast, the court found that pro rata allocation under
the collateral source doctrine balances the interests of both the
insurer and the insured for med-pay reimbursement situations.52
The insured receives the benefit of lower premiums and may
retain payments if he or she is unable to recover from the thirdparty tortfeasor.53 And, the made-whole rule still guarantees
that the insured recover the full amount of actual damages before
reimbursement is claimed.54 So long as it is undisputed that the
recovery amount adequately compensates the insured, equity is
satisfied when the insurer reduces the amount of reimbursement
to account for its fair share of the attorney fees.55

46

Id. (citing Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. 465 P.2d 61, 64 n.7 (Cal.

1970)).
47 Id. at 981–82. The collateral source rule “prohibits the reduction of damages a
tortfeasor owes to the plaintiff because the plaintiff received compensation from an
independent source.” Id. (citing Helfend, 465 P.2d at 63).
48 Id. at 982 (citing Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal.App.4th
263, 276–81 (2005)).
49 Id. at 982.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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Holding
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal.56 The court held
that attorney fees are not to be included in the made-whole
calculation, but rather that pro rata apportionment of attorney
fees between insured and insurer is the better allocation of
responsibility.57 Therefore, because Quintana did not dispute the
amount of the med-pay provision payment, nor that the $400
originally deducted from reimbursement was less than 21st
Century’s share, 21st Century properly accounted for its pro rata
share and Quintana had effectively been made whole.58
Concurrences
Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment, expanding on
the reasoning that Quintana’s position was contrary to California
law.59 Justice Kennard clarified that although Plut v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co. was imprecise, its statement that reimbursement
may be sought only when the insured has recovered “some or all”
of his attorney fees is an accurate reflection of California law.60
This is because recoupment of “some” of the litigation expenses
refers to a situation where the insurance payments comprise only
a portion of the total loss, in which case the insurer will be
responsible for its pro rata share.61 Recoupment of “all” of the
litigation expenses refers to a situation where the insurance
payments is equal to the total loss, in which case the insurer’s
pro rata share would essentially be 100%.62
Secondly, Justice Kennard asserted that pro rata allocation
of attorney fees is more consistent with the “American rule”
under which each party bears his own litigation costs.63 Justice
Kennard pointed out that if the burden of attorney fees cannot be
shifted to the actual tortfeasor, it is inconsistent to allow it to be
Further, equitable
shifted to the insurance carrier.64
apportionment is also consistent with similar workers’
compensation situations, which also requires pro rata share of
litigation costs.65 Lastly, Justice Kennard echoed the sentiment
of the majority in explaining that including attorney fees in the
made-whole rule would preclude any insurer reimbursement
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 982–83.
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id. at 983 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id. at 984 (citing Plut v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 105 (2000)).
Id. at 984.
Id.
Id. at 984–85
Id. at 985.
Id.
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under med-pay provisions because the average policy limit is
lower than average litigation costs.66 This would force in an
increase in the cost of providing med-pay insurance, thus
resulting in higher premiums.67
Justice Werdegar filed a separate concurrence to provide
“alternative rationale” for the court’s conclusion.68 First, Justice
Werdegar looked to the relationship between subrogation and
reimbursement, and pointed out that the reason insurers seek
reimbursement rather than subrogation in personal injury claims
is because California bars the assignment of personal injury
claims.69 This is simply a procedural difference, with the
principles behind reimbursement and subrogation—that the
insured should not be permitted to received double recovery—
remains identical.70 As such, Justice Werdegar reasoned that
reimbursement and subrogation cases should have the same
substantive outcomes.71 Including attorney fees in the madewhole calculation would yield different results, because under
subrogation the insurer would recover its payment less its share
of attorney fees, while under reimbursement the insurer would
recover nothing.72 But, under the pro rata theory the results
would be identical, with both subrogation and reimbursement
resulting in the insured recovering its payment less its share of
attorney fees.73
Secondly, Justice Werdegar pointed out that if attorney fees
were included in the made-whole rule, the amount of
reimbursement would be dependent on the extent of the insured’s
attorney fees.74 Since contingency fees vary, this would result in
disparate treatment of policyholders.75 This causes a med-pay
policy to effectively convert from medical to legal reimbursement,
which is not the purpose of med-pay insurance.76
Legal Significance
The court’s decision precludes an insured who has received
med-pay insurance benefits from factoring in his or her litigation
costs when determining whether he or she has been “made

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id.
Id. at 986 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id. at 987–88.
Id.
Id. at 988.
Id.
Id.
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whole” by amounts recovered from a third party tortfeasor.
Instead, once it is undisputed that the insured has received a
recovery amount satisfying the full amount of actual damages,
the insured may deduct only a pro rata share of attorney fees
from the reimbursement amount owed to the insurer.

